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The University of Newcastle, 
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ABSTRACT 
Using local authority planning in Dublin as a case sludy. the extent and effectiveness of 
community and development interests' participation in policy formulation is examined. A 
primary locus is on the nature and timing of participation as a determinant of the rclalive 
influence that each can cxerl over policy decisions. A critical distinction is drawn between 
formal and informal participation channels. The vast array of" informal channels available to 
development interests can mean that they have little need to participate formally; thus a 
primary and secondary layer of influence on policy formulation can be distinguished. The 
primary layer is largely informal, on-going and pervasive. The secondary layer is formal, 
controlled and capable only of adapting rather than formulating policy. This supports the 
existence of an incontestable basis of planning policy that emerges from the primary layer 
of influence and reflects an inherent acceptance of the legitimacy of development interests" 
demands. As a consequence, questions are raised about the role of participation within a 
planning system which functions in support of capital. 
Key Index Words: Urban planning, policy formulation. Dublin. 
Introduction 
This paper contributes to a body of" literature that 
positions urban planning as playing a crucial role 
within the capitalist state apparatus. This role is (a) to 
manage the built environment to avert crises in the 
development process and (b) to ensure social cohesion 
by creating a land use pattern and urban form that 
promotes and legitimates current social and property 
relations (see Blowers. 1980; Freestone. 1981; Knox 
and Cullen. 1981; Kirk 1982; Fainstein and Fainstein. 
1985; Feagin, 1984 and 1990; Harvey. 1989; Healey 
et.al.. 1989; Dear. 1990; Fainstein. 1994). While adopt-
ing a political economy approach, the paper examines 
aspects of community and development interests' par-
ticipation in the planning process that facilitate this 
role. In the tradition of this theoretical approach, this 
examination explores the relationship between market 
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based economies and democratically based politics as 
they are revealed through participation within the 
urban planning system. The political economy ap-
proach provides a comprehensive framework within 
which to consider the broad implications of the social 
power relations reflected within the planning system. 
Moreover, it provides the conceptual basis for posi-
tioning the urban planning process as an integral pan 
of the capitalist state apparatus. 
Using local authority urban planning in Dublin as a 
case study, the paper investigates the extent and effec-
tiveness of community group and development inter-
est input into the formulation of" planning policy. Its 
primary aim is to examine how the nature of participa-
tion, the stage at which it occurs, and planners* reac-
tions to it, create distinctive layers of" influence with 
quite different capabilities of affecting policy formu-
lation. The paper's finding thai developers' influence 
is paramount in policy formulation is hardly ground-
breaking. More significant is the identification of the 

































Power and Influence in Urban Planning 65 
tion operates to ensure the legitimacy of the planning 
system while generating policy and practice that serve 
the long term interests of capital. 
By positioning urban planning within its broader 
political framework, the paper also shows that devel-
opment interests have a privileged position within the 
planning system. Little formal participation is re-
quired by them to ensure that their interests are ac-
counted for in policy decisions. Their political and 
economic strength, ready access to political decision 
makers, and an inherent acceptance of the legitimacy 
of their demands create an uncontested and unrecog-
nised bias that has become integral to the planning 
decision making process. In short, their priorities im-
plicitly underscore policy formulation. 
Participation in the Urban Planning Process 
The official rationale behind public participation is 
thai it is a mechanism for transferring power from 
government and bureaucracy to the community. The 
need for participation in urban planning arose from the 
broader demand for government accountability asso-
ciated with 1960s radicalism and the decline of the 
political consensus (Blowers. 1986). Requirements to 
provide mechanisms for participation were incorpo-
rated into the planning legislation of the U.K. (1964) 
and Ireland (1963). However, though public participa-
tion has been espoused in principle, its official inter-
pretation has tended to be narrow and to be prefaced by 
warnings against expending undue extra time or money 
on its practice. 
The practice of participation can vary from genuine 
power sharing lo ineffective tokenism that serves 
simply to pass information on lo ihe public on a 
numberof pre-determined policy options (see Arnstein. 
1969; Dennis, 1970; Young, 1985). Thornley (1977) 
has identified a continuum of three approaches to 
planning participation: radical, liberal and conserva-
tive, which create very different contexts for partici-
pation. At one extreme of the continuum is the radical 
approach thai aims at making conflict explicit and 
increasing awareness of unbalanced power relations 
within planning. Radical theorists view participation 
in ihe status quo as participation between unequal 
partners. Inequalities must be dealt with if power is to 
be equitably shared. So. participation is theorised as a 
means lo alter society's power relations. As radical 
participation requires delegation of power from the 
professional elites who control planning procedures it 
has received little support from professional planners. 
There is little likelihood that official planning exer-
cises will espouse it. given the technocratic education 
and socialisation process that planners undergo 
(McLoughlin. 1992). 
The liberal approach envisages the containment of 
conflict through bargaining and institutionalisation. 
Though conflict is not seen as fundamental it is ac-
cepted and considered to be manageable through con-
cession. It is mediated through established institutions 
to create orderly and controlled change. Participation 
occurs within a set of discrete and limited rules. This 
is reflected in the view, prevalent among planning 
professionals, that the only realistic time to involve the 
public in plan or policy making is after a limited range 
of options has been clarified (Knox, 1994). The bu-
reaucratic confines within which local authority plan-
ners operate tend to favour this model of participation. 
At the other extreme of the continuum is the con-
servative approach which aims at establishing a con-
sensus of values through participation, which main-
tains social order. Information is exchanged between 
planners and participants and a chain of feed-back, 
adaptation, and equilibrium is established. The exer-
cise of participation is seen as a two-way information 
exchange rather than power-sharing in decision-mak-
ing. Policy is adapted to public opinion and attitudes 
ratherthan being formed by them. Participation allows 
for the ostensible sharing of authority but. to avoid 
destabilising the status quo, authorities must be confi-
dent that issues are innocuous before they enter the 
participation arena. The aim. Thornley (1977) claims, 
is to empower a decision-making elite by ensuring 
their legitimacy. This is achieved through the apparent 
accountability provided by supplying an improved 
quality of information to the public about pre-selected 
(and innocuous) issues. These issues, because they are 
visible, become the key issues for public discussion. 
The Irish legislation of 1963 came equipped with 
very generous provision for participation, aiming os-
tensibly at creating a democratic system of account-
able decision-making. However, if Thornley's ap-
proaches to participation are considered as a con-
tinuum, this examination of participation in Dublin's 
planning system reveals a practice that may be posi-
tioned closest to the conservative approach, with nota-
ble concessions to a liberal approach. Information 
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Figure I: Formulating a Development Plan 
tional channels take precedence over power sharing. 
Planners" belief that the public's best interests are 
genuinely served by planning's everyday operations 
creates a tendency For them to accept only marginal 
suggestions for change that are compatible with their 
overall plans. The input of development and business 
interests into policy information is distinguished from 
that of the community (a) by planners" more positive 
reaction to their input and (b) by their ease of access to 
decision-making echelons beyond the planning de-
partment, e.g. at ministerial level. This input enters the 
planning system and decision-making process at an 
entirely different level to that of the community. 
The following discussion elaborates on and demon-
strates the validity of the claims made above. For those 
unfamiliar with the Irish planning system. Figures 1 
and 2 outline the policy formulation and development 
control processes. These figures also clarify the role of 
the key actors involved in these processes and high-
light the formal opportunities for participation by 
development and community interests. 
Sources Used in the Formulation of Planning 
Policy 
Superficially at least, the factor that differentiates 
between community and development interests' input 
into the planning policy formulation is their access to 
the planning department and to other relevant deci-
sion-making bodies. The existence of differential lev-
els of access to planners is largely unacknowledged by 
authorities. No distinction is made between the two 
interests" input within the formal structures for partici-
pation. The failure to recognise this and its impact on 
resulting planning outcomes ensures that the partici-
pation of many community groups will be entirely 
ineffectual. 
A useful starting point in quantifying the impact of 
development and community interests' input is to 
identify the sources used by planning officials in the 
formulation of policy. This also helps to identify and 
clarify the idea of distinctive layers of influence. 
Discussion here is based on a series of indepth inter-
views carried out with Dublin planners, development 
interests and community groups between 1988 and 
1990. Of 30 planners interviewed. 27 were employees 
of the three local authorities with jurisdiction over the 
Dublin region and 3 were in private practice. The 23 
developers interviewed represented a range of scales 
from institutional developers to large scale develop-
ment companies with international interests, to small 
companies with purely local interests. All were prima-
rily involved in the development of office space. The 
29 community groups were chiefly resident action 
groups based throughout Dublin city, its inner and 
outer suburbs. However, some umbrella groups such 
as An Taisce were also included. Responses to inter-
view questions were grouped and are discussed here in 
terms of percentages who gave particular responses. 
Thus, categories are not mutually exclusive. Quota-
tions from interviews are identified by a designated 
code referring to whether the source was a planner (P). 
developer (D) or community group (C) and to which 
individual is quoted. 
In the development of planning policy there is, of 
course, a basis of technical information, population 
projections, statistics and land-use surveys that serves 
as a basic audit of service and facility needs. However, 
the majority of planners (62%) specified informal 
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Application Tor planning permission 
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Figure 2: Participation in development control 
lion, with 12°/< of these specifically stressing informal 
professional contact. Less than a quarter (24%) men-
tioned formal contact with state or semi-state agencies 
such as the Industrial Development Authority. Dublin 
Bus or the Department of Education. Little weight 
appears to be given to contact with community groups 
at the initial policy formulation stage. 
Submissions and the use of councillors were quite 
strongly emphasised by planners (34% and 3 1 % re-
spectively) as a source at this stage. However, the 
submissions specified were not from the general pub-
lic but from interest groups representing development 
and business interests e.g. the Construction Industry 
Federation and the Dublin Chamber of Commerce. 
Only 14% of community groups had used councillors 
in the attempt to influence initial policy formulation 
(though fewer than half the groups in total (45%) 
attempted to become involved at this stage). At this 
point in the process, councillors appear to be used 
chiefly to exert informal political pressure on planners 
on behalf of the development lobby. 
The emphasis placed on informal contact, casual 
meetings, phone calls and letters is very significant. 
Informal professional contact was the most frequently 
cited form of contact overall. Such contact is often not 
specifically aimed at the development plan and related 
policy but involves the discussion of individual devel-
opments. Nonetheless it filters through to have an 
indirect and vital impact on policy formulation. As one 
67 
planner put it. "we do nothing except publicise the plan 
display. The general requirements of developers are 
expressed in the weight of planning applications and 
appeals. Professional contact is largely informal. There 
is very little formal contact"(P21). Such contact ranges 
from casual suggestions made about development 
plan policies at pie-application consultations, to the 
other extreme described by a representative of the 
Dublin Chamber of Commerce: "(Planners) are help-
ful and forthcoming. There is continuous dialogue. We 
discuss problems and make suggestions. We are often 
in sync with the planners* views. We have a special 
viewing of the draft (planning policy) arranged. We 
don*t have to object or appeal. We have a good, first 
name relationship with the planners" (Dl). 
Pre-application Consultations 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of development in-
terests' informal leverage is found after the policy 
formulation stage through the use of pre-application 
consultations. Pre-application consultations between 
planners and developers, besides being explicitly ac-
commodative of development interests, are a major 
source used by planners in piecing together the thrust 
of developers" demands. Though they occur continu-
ally and are related to development control not policy, 
policy is nonetheless clearly influenced by the ongo-
ing feedback they provide. 
There was unanimous approval of these consulta-
tions among planners and the majority of developers 
(95%) regularly used them to discuss proposals prior 
to applying for planning permission. The developers 
outlined the content of these consultations as a "full 
and frank discussion*"(D4) which is "necessary and 
valuable, especially regarding cost and time'*(D6); "if 
a developer finds that planners are totally opposed to 
a development, they will hint as to what is acceptable" 
(D22). Though rarely explicity termed 'negotiation*. 
6 1 % of planners considered the process effectively to 
be one of negotiation or bargaining; "we ask for 3x 
expecting 2x. (The developer) offer(s) 1 x expecting to 
give 2x. We split the difference"(PI6). The result is 
that "developers know what would be in the planner's 
mind before applying, so this helps their success 
rate"(D22). The process described closely mirrors 
Simmie and French's (1989) model of corporate par-
ticipation: a reciprocal relationship in which an under-


































each party can expect to push the other. No respondent 
referred to the fact that this entire process takes place 
before any opportunity is provided for public com-
ment. This reflects the planners" view of themselves as 
acting on behalf of the public interest in such cases. 
The accommodation of private sector interests 
through pre-application consultations is clearly ac-
cepted within the planning profession rather than be-
ing problematised, or even acknowledged, as the ac-
commodation of a vested interest. This is ingrained in 
decision-making agencies at both central and local 
government level making it unnecessary for these 
interests to be forcefully asserted at the policy-making 
stage (Short el al., 1986). The vast majority of devel-
opers (74%) agreed that they could influence develop-
ment policy. As one developer suggested, "slowly, by 
constantly requiring the same thing we can put our 
demands across"(D2); "by going to the planning de-
partment and making clear what our needs are. plan-
ners get to know"(D 1). Though development interests 
express these views in pre-application consultations in 
an individual capacity, their impact on planning au-
thorities tends to be felt as a unified lobby. A clearly 
defined and identifiable "developers' interest' exists, 
by virtue of their common interests, which tends to be 
more uniform than the diverse and parochial concerns 
of community groups (Girling. 1982; Grist. 1983). 
Their demands are shaped by conditions in the market. 
The expectation that this will be built into planning 
policy is continually reinforced among planning offi-
cials through numerous other channels also; local 
representatives, politicians, lobbying by the Construc-
tion Industry Federation, the Construction Industry 
Development Board, and bodies representing com-
mercial interests (City Centre Business Association. 
Chamber of Commerce etc). 
The Strategic Importance of Development 
Interests 
Development interests hold a strategically vital po-
sition in development planning and policy. Without 
their proposing development in accordance with policy 
guidelines, planners have no means of policy imple-
mentation. Reflecting this, 79% of planners believed 
that they could not implement policies promoting 
development of a type, or in a location, thai departed 
from the logic of the market; "we can offer till we are 
blue in the face but we have to wait until the developer 
wants to. We can create the climate but the market 
decides. There is nothing in normal planning controls 
that can force the market"(Pl). Failure to produce a 
development plan in line with market criteria may 
result in developers simply not implementing any 
policies that are not agreed with; "developers have 
influence by simply not developing if it does not suit, 
so the planners get nothing done"(D6). 
Theoretically, the developers' strategic position does 
not affect which policies are formulated, but its influ-
ence on which policies can actually be implemented is 
absolute. As one developer put it. "obviously, devel-
opers and business interests will be more influential. 
We are consulted and listened to. We usually back 
planners' opinions. We don't take the narrow view of 
residents' associations. We are the only ones paying 
rates. This has an effect on what planners listen to" 
(Dl). Public participation is demoted in importance as, 
obviously, the 'general public' plays little role in 
implementing planning policy despite living with its 
outcomes. Because of their strategic economic impor-
tance development interests effectively, if indirectly, 
come close to being collaborative decision-makers on 
policy formulation. This position is ensured through 
informal, on-going communication allowing develop-
ers to keep in touch with prevailing attitudes in the 
planning authority and (o tailor their dealings accord-
ingly. Business interests are not so much expressed as 
anticipated (Knox, 1994), so their influence is ob-
scured. Policy is clearly conditioned by the political 
context in which it is set. the strategic importance of 
developers' investment capital and the need to adhere 
to certain imperatives of capitalism (Healey el al., 
1989). An informal atmosphere promoting a pro-
development ethos is created and can prove difficult lo 
resist. Although this atmosphere is not explicit it 
nevertheless infiltrates the entire planning system. As 
one planner outlined: "there is a web of influence and 
power which is very difficult to break through. An 
environment for a decision is made which makes it 
difficult for any other decision than the desired one to 
be reached. A planning consultant makes a submission 
for the client and gets in touch with the minister, who 
contacts the manager, who contacts the senior admin-
istrator and the technical staff. If everyone is saying the 
same thing, including the councillors, this creates the 
environment. It is an informal ready-up. There is 
nothing necessarily malicious nor is there personal 

































Power and Influence in Urban Planning 69 
put forward an alternative except the planner, who is 
isolated. These informal ways never get into the public-
light. There are informal linkages leading to the de-
sired decision. It is a power game in which you cannot 
put forward a successful alternative. Planning tries to 
raise other issues but never can"(P20). 
This atmosphere is maintained by the strategic im-
portance of development interests and is fuelled by the 
informal contact network available to developers. A 
variety of channels of communication, political con-
nections and a knowledge of the system often facili-
tated by the use of private planning consultants, allows 
development interests to sustain their privileged posi-
tion. Simmie and French (1989) identified a 'perma-
nent liaison' between planning departments and 
corporatist interests, allowing them regular and unre-
stricted access to key planning officials. They stressed 
informal contacts as the most important means of 
mediating corporate interests. Community interests 
rarely have such channels of communication open to 
them, nor can they easily afford to engage the expertise 
of professional planning consultants. 
The Incontestable Basis of Policy 
The privileged position of development interests is 
reflected in the fact that 65% of developers did not 
attempt to influence the development plan or policies 
before its publication. This initial stage is the stage at 
which suggestions and submissions are most likely to 
be assimilated in a manner that could be formative to 
policy rather than simply influencing subsequent ad-
aptation of policy options. Development interests' 
lack of involvement at this stage initially appears to be 
contradictory until the question is raised of whether 
they need to participate formally at this stage at all to 
ensure that their inierests are considered. The range 
and frequency of informal contact ensures that their 
interests are in-built in the decision-making process. 
Healey el al. (1989) assert that the needs of develop-
ment are anticipated in draft policies put forward for 
consideration in a development plan. This is the 'pre-
politics processing' of policy options (Roweis. 1981). 
Public debate around these policies, and potential 
change, can only take place within the bounds of the 
original policies forwarded by the planning depart-
ment. An 'incontestable basis' (Healey el al., 1989) 
accounting for the needs of the development industry 
is automatically written into policies and included in 
decision-making criteria, ensuring that continued ad-
vantage is conferred on capital. Certain options that do 
not accord with dominant priorities are thus excluded 
early on (Dunleavy, 1980; Young 1985). Public inputs 
are only seriously considered after this process has 
occurred, ensuring that debate is confined to innocu-
ous issues that do not question the legitimacy of 
development interests. Though the policy package 
may be altered, the contents remain substantially un-
changed. There is an underlying value consensus within 
(and beyond) the planning department which seeks to 
promote, facilitate and not unduly restrict develop-
ment. This also means that accepting the general thrust 
(if not the specifics) of development interests demands 
is perceived as a neutral rather than an explicitly 
political stance. 
The large majority of developers (74%) had at-
tempted to have some input into development policies 
after the draft review had been published. Nearly half 
of these (48%) stressed professional contact again as 
the major opportunity fordoing so; "formal and infor-
mal letters and chats, ... professional contacts and 
phone calls" (D2). These informal chats are doubly 
facilitated by planners'willingness to incorporate them 
and by developers' use of professional planning exper-
tise in addressing planning issues. 
Thus, an accumulation of effective forms of input by 
or on behalf of development interest can be identified. 
These sources are largely informal and exist at various 
stages in the planning process yet, combined, they 
create persuasive feedback to the policy formulation 
stage. This constitutes the primary layer of influence. 
The input of the community constitutes a secondary 
layerof influence that is superimposed upon the policy 
basis emerging from the pre-existing and continuous 
inputs of the primary layer. The lack of clarity about 
who controls decisions and resources and about the 
location of power allows those interests with profes-
sional and political knowledge to dominate. Simulta-
neously it obscures the process that produces this bias 
and so maintains legitimacy. The end result is that 
developers' interests can become the non-negotiable 
basis of local authority policy, so they do not need to 
be strongly reasserted at public forums when the stage 
of open public participation arrives. 
There is strong evidence that these power relations 
are reinforced through informal pro-development po-
litical pressure, placed on the planning department by 


































local. This was acknowledged as being influential by 
80% of planners, 70% of developers and 85% of 
community groups (for further discussion, see 
McGuirk. 1994). In a practice which is theoretically 
neutral and carried out at a local level, pro-develop-
ment political influence limits the effectiveness of 
community participation. There is no equivalent source 
of political lobbying that can address the diffuse and 
variable demands and interests of 'the community* or 
the "public interest': both ill-defined terms that ob-
scure as much as they reveal. 
Community Groups* Involvement in Policy 
Matters 
A comparison with community groups' involve-
ment in policy matters highlights how theirexperience 
differs from that of development interests. A surpris-
ingly high proportion of groups had attempted to 
participate in policy formulation (57%). However, 
what was classified as an attempt to influence policy 
may simply mean a letter submitted to the planning 
department complaining about a specific problem in 
the locality rather than addressing a problem in the 
published policy review document. Later discussion 
indicates that such submissions tend to be left aside, 
considered to be too parochial to be relevant to policy 
issues. Revealingly. 79% of community groups had 
never been in direct contact with planning officials to 
discuss policy prior to the publication of a draft policy 
review. Most were unaware of the review until the 
draft's publication. More than half (55%) had never 
been in contact on policy matters even after its publi-
cation. 
Significantly, when planners were asked to rank 
various actors in terms of their influence on policy 
formulation, 'development interests' and 'business 
interests' both received mean ranks above those given 
to either 'the public' or to 'residents' and tenants' 
associations' reflecting the effectiveness of informal 
contact (Figure 3). The mean score awarded to 'the 
public' was above that only of 'academics', giving 
some indication of the weakness of public input at this 
stage. 
The planners pointed out that (he high score awarded 
to council members related to their ability to veto the 
plan and its policies. More light can be shed on their 
apparent role if community groups' perspectives on 
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Figure 3: Average rank of perceived influences on plan 
formation 
how exactly councillors are useful to them is exam-
ined. In total. 90% of community groups had utilised 
councillors at some stage in their participation, though 
this was chiefly when dealing with a specific develop-
ment application. Komito (1983) has questioned the 
representativeness of councillors in Ireland and is 
supported by a vast international literature raising 
similar doubts (Dennis. 1972; Rakove, 1975; Newton, 
1976; Young 1985; Short el al. 1986; Hampton, 
1987). Moreover, only 14% of community groups had 
used councillors at the critical initial stages of policy 
formulation. The key role that they play for commu-
nity groups is merely one of facilitating access to the 
planning department and extracting information oth-

































Power and Influence in Urban Planning 71 
mation planners are reluctant to give..." (C3I), "they 
get information the Corporation won't give us"(C5), 
" they 're invaluable in knowing what door to 
approach"(CI4), "we only got a meeting after three 
letters were ignored. Then (the local T.D. and council-
lor) got us one within ten minutes"(C28). Many of the 
groups liked to have backing and advice from a coun-
cillororT.D. on approaching (he planning department; 
"all things are easier with a councillor. They found the 
right route for us to take. They got us to apply to 
departments we didn't even know existed"(C 17). Most 
groups did not refer to the outcome of participation 
mediated by a councillor but seemed satisfied once 
contact with the planning department was achieved. 
This illustrates the therapeutic effect of participation 
(Cullen. 1980). If a situation satisfies people, social 
harmony is maintained regardless of whether concrete 
change is achieved (Reade. 1987). This "therapy' can 
diffuse and channel dissatisfaction into less threaten-
ing modes by offering a certain amount of restricted 
contact with planning officials. Once contact is estab-
lished, groups become wary of endangering it. Expec-
tations become confined to the definition of what is 
possible, which in turn shapes community groups' 
activities (Newton. 1976; Kirk. 1980). 
The stage at which community participation takes 
place, and the attention paid to it, are vital concerns in 
the analysis of policy formulation. Understanding the 
timing and treatment of public input compared to that 
of development interests reveals the legitimising func-
tion of public participation. It also further exposes how 
an incontestable policy basis is formed subject only to 
marginal public scrutiny. 
Planners' Contact with the General Public 
The restriction of community policy input is far 
from a simple matter of the community's lack ol 
strategic positioning. The timing of their input and 
how planners then address their input both play impor-
tant roles in confining them to the secondary layer. 
Moreover, most community groups concentrate their 
efforts on dealing with specific localised problems, not 
with policy issues (Grist, 1983) (Figure4). This results 
from a combination of factors related to the perceived 
abstract nature of strategic planning, the difficulty of 
sustaining community interest in planning policies 
whose impacts are neither immediate nor obvious, 
perceptions of powerlessness in addressing some of 
the 'bigger' structural issues of the planning system 
and the tendency to defend a community's own 'turf", 
letting other communities do likewise. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that early involve-
ment in policy formulation is rare. Meeting with resi-
dents' associations' representatives after publication 
of the policy document was mentioned by 46% of 
planners as the primary source of contact with the 
public. These meetings aspire to explain policies, 
present information about their aims and get feedback: 
usually an immediate gauging of public reaction. Al-
though these formal meetings took place at loo late a 
stage for formative and positive input into policy, they 
seem to defuse demand for public input quite success-
fully. As one planner put it "there is ... a sense of the 
general confession about it. It is therapeutic. We go 
through their worries with them and they have a name 
for the faces they see"(P6). Another called it an "op-
portunity for them to let off steam"(P5) which he 
claimed has a defusing effect. The value of these 
meetings lies more in their 'safety valve' role than in 
their contribution to meaningful participaiion. They 
can end up being what one planner called "explanatory 
seminars"(P10). Nevertheless, the public demand for 
a voice is met as the majority of groups concern 
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themselves not with policy issues but with more local-
ised place-based issues. The essential purpose of le-
gitimation is served - the planning system is justified 
by appearing to serve the public (Thomas. 1976; Katz, 
1989; Burns, 1990; Fainstein, 1990). 
Furthermore, one third of planners (31%) listed 
objections, appeals, or oral hearings as the main source 
of contact with the public. All of these relate to specific 
developments and have no immediate impact upon 
policy formulation. Because they occur at an advanced 
stage in the planning process (Figure 2) the nature of 
public participation is shaped into negative objecting 
rather than constructive contribution to planning mat-
ters. The timing of opportunities for participation, the 
formal nature of these opportunities and the enforced 
negative stance they impose on community groups 
shapes planners' attitudes towards their input and 
confines them to a secondary layer of influence. 
Given the lack of opportunities for informal contact 
with planners, community groups rely on formal con-
tact. Using these channels of communication requires 
them to adopt certain forms of articulation that demand 
what Dearlove (1973) defined as middle class skills. 
These formal channels set the agenda and determine 
the parameters of what can be discussed by presenting 
pre-set policy options. They determine what is negoti-
able and what constitutes a problem. Planners' own 
interpretation of what the public wants is imposed on 
public feedback (Fagence. 1977). Resulting adapta-
tion to policy is mediated through established institu-
tions. Concessions granted are yielded along lines 
defined by planners' interpretations. Ultimately, con-
II ict is managed to create orderly and controlled change 
wiihin pre-established parameters. Participation of 
this nature can clearly be positioned along the con-
tinuum between Thornley's conservative and liberal 
approaches. 
Planners' Perceptions of Public Participation 
Planners' attitudes towards public participation are 
important because they determine the extent to which 
public input will be taken into account. In general, 
attitudes were not positive. Members of the public-
were referred to as "request machines" (PI), and as 
"pests"(P15) who tend to "mix everything and every 
department up"(P3), "they expect planning to influ-
ence what it cannot. They are not aware of what a 
planner does or can do" (P4). Almost three-fifths of the 
planners (57%) referred to problems of the public 
being uninterested and/or being unable to understand 
issues involved with general policy, though one plan-
ner conceded that "(planners) are expert enough to 
make (planning) complex enough for the average 
person not to understand"!P24). There is a marked 
proclivity to use 'competence' as the criterion to merit 
participation. Planners' belief that the public is unin-
formed about planning issues, unaware of how the 
system works and uninterested in its wider implica-
tions, is a crucial influence on how they react to public 
involvement (Fagence. 1977; Dunleavy and O'Leary, 
1987). These beliefs mean that contact between the 
two becomes what one planner called "an information 
gathering exercise with no real exchange of 
information"!P1). Residents' Associations were re-
ferred to as "people with their own ideas for what they 
need in an area and no wider idea of how things have 
to develop for a city to keep working"* PI );"they do not 
give views that help in the formulation of policy") P10). 
"most only perceive their own patch"(P15). Many 
groups are not motivated to participate until the impli-
cations of a policy begin to have effects on their 
neighbourhoods. It is in the nature of area based 
community groups to be primarily interested in mat-
ters viewed as parochial by policy makers. The use-
values they apply to their localities are at odds with the 
exchange-values applied by capital. Places of value to 
local communities as their 'turf" are not part of the 
conventional concept of commodity applied to place 
as 'space' by developers (Molotch and Logan. 1987). 
The predominantly local focus places community 
groups in an inferior position in any conflict with 
planners and developers. This is due on the one hand 
to the dominant criteria of development interests, and 
on the other hand to planners' limited approach to 
participation. 
Adaptation to policy sought on the basis of 'paro-
chial' concerns are neither orderly nor controlled and 
therefore are at odds with a conservative/liberal ap-
proach to public participation. As a result, partici-
pants' views are taken into account, as legislation 
demands they must be. but then subsumed and lost 
within the broader policy directions of the 'public 
interest'. Planners have perceived themselves to repre-
sent a consensual public interest that can surpass the 
array of divisive, sectional and parochial interests of 
the community at large; "we live in the city do we not. 
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has a particular interest to push. They do not have a 
balanced view. Planners know what is going on from 
day to day contact" (PI9). As one planner frankly 
stated; "we are employed to do the job for the public. 
(Participation) is like buying a dog and barking your-
self (P19). The community is clearly made up of a 
variety of conflicting interests and class positions, 
some of which are irreconcilable. There is no 'general 
public' but a series of public, sectional interests, and 
social strata, some of which have influence and power 
and some of which are isolated and fragmentary. Such 
a 'public interest' approach collapses public diversity 
of opinion and attempts to contain it within manage-
able categories. Public proposals can be redefined on 
planners" terms and non-conforming aspects can be 
by-passed. Planners decide how much time to allot to 
the official channels of participation, whether to ig-
nore the opinions presented, and how to balance them 
against the opinions of development and business 
interests, without whom the authority's plans will not 
be implemented. Community input is channelled 
through formal conduits that are thoroughly managed 
and do not compare with development interests' infor-
mal but effective leverage. 
Problems such as these reflect poorly on community 
groups' chances of meaningful participation and 
broaden the gulf between the primary and secondary 
layers of influence. This is a function of the pluralist 
notion upon which planning is founded (Dear and 
Clark. 1981b). This notion promotes the treatment of 
all groups as if they had an equal voice and fails to 
recognise varying degrees of access to decision-mak-
ing forums in planning (Long, 1975; Simmie, 1985; 
Duncan el«/.. 1988). Once the opportunity for partici-
pation is provided, it is assumed that development 
interests and community groups are equally enabled to 
voice their opinion and make themselves heard. While 
the planning system may be overtly pluralist, the 
assumed pluralist politics, open and equitable debate is 
simply not the basis on which planning participation 
operates. Common pluralist assumptions fail to recog-
nise that the economic power base extends to affect the 
control of and access to the political power base. 
Nevertheless, when asked whether the varying re-
sources available to groups made a difference to their 
ability to participate effectively, 93% of the planners 
acknowledged that it did. Thirty nine per cent recog-
nised the importance of engaging professional help if 
attempting to oppose a development proposal; "devel-
opers will employ professionals. If people want to 
oppose development they will normally need to em-
ploy professional expertise" (PI8). Indeed, the fact 
that 93% of community groups had utilised profes-
sional help in their dealings with the planning depart-
ment suggests that they too are very well aware of their 
importance: "we just wouldn't be able to do it without 
professional help. On an appeal particularly, it's abso-
lutely vital. We just couldn't afford what a developer 
can. You feel you just don't make an impression. 
When your group is run just on voluntary effort you get 
tired" (C32), "help is vital, we couldn't manage with-
out it. Planners just sleep if (our input) is not in their 
language. They perk up once they hear professional 
language" (C32). 11 follows that a simple increase in 
the opportunity to participate through existing means 
does not equalise rates of participation across commu-
nity groups (Verba and Nie, 1972). Many groups 
struggle to meet the standard of input demanded to be 
effective; many others are simply discouraged entirely 
from participating. 
Despite planners' recognition of the uneven nature 
of community input, only two of those interviewed 
reconised that this unevenness meant that planners' 
perception of community demands must be unrepre-
sentative. The belief that planners speak for the public 
interest appears to obscure this connection for most 
planners. So, their perception of community demands 
is based on feedback gained from partial publ ic partici-
pation. This feedback is interpreted according to the 
pre-conceived notions and values of planners, and 
applied to a set of policy options that are already 
determined according to the long term interests of 
development capital. The notion of an incontestable 
basis underlying policy formation is never 
problematised. 
Conclusion 
By examining the policy making stages of the plan-
ning process it becomes apparent that there are distinc-
tive layers of influence that impinge to different ex-
tents on shaping policy. The examination of Dublin's 
case suggests the existence of distinctive channels 
through which this influence is transmitted; some 
formal and restricted to more manageable stages, some 


































ence. The primary layer is dominated by economically 
and politically strong development and business inter-
ests. This stems from informal, continuous input and is 
supported by an implicit acceptance of the legitimacy 
of facilitating development. To a considerable extent 
the existence of this layer negates the need for these 
interests to utilise formal participatory channels. The 
need to facilitate the requirements of development 
interests at policy level is intensified by current eco-
nomic circumstances and. in Dublin's case, the urgent 
need to attract development investment (M'Guirk. 
1994). This layer of influence is crucial in shaping the 
ultimate parameters of policy options. Ii is decisive in 
producing policy's incontestable basis which deter-
mines the climate for specific decision-making. Such 
a policy and decision-making climate is ultimately 
reified in urban form. 
The secondary layer, which applies to community 
influence, is transmitted through formal channels and 
confined to dealing with a pre-determined set of op-
tions. Scope for adaptation of policy exists within this 
set but the opportunity to influence basic policy thrusts, 
determined within the primary layer of influence, is 
foregone. Community groups are involved at a stage 
and in a manner that confines their influence to the 
secondary layer. Such participation amounts to what 
Thomley (1977) has identified as a conservative ap-
proach which ensures a bias in the information re-
ceived by planning authorities, and in the manner in 
which that information is incorporated (Healey et <il.. 
1989). Combined with planners' assumed role as de-
fenders of the public interest, this allows the priorities 
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of development interests with access to the primary 
layer to permeate and to persist in emerging policy. 
These priorities remain unchallenged as the political 
tensions that arise from the conflict between use value 
and exchange value ("space' as commodity and 'place' 
as locality) is diverted into the unthreatening and more 
orderly channels of formal participation at later stages 
in the planning process (Fincher. 1981). The persistent 
failure of planners to recognise the incontestable basis 
and the pluralist assumptions underlying community 
participation ensures that it remains unchallenged. 
Though the contribution of public participation to the 
production of democratic plans is a primary source of 
legitimacy for planning (McAuslan. 1980: Ravetz. 
1980: Dear 1986). community impact on the funda-
mental premises of policy matters remains largely 
peripheral. Thus legitimised, urban planning outcomes 
continue to play a critical role within the state appara-
tus. Potential crises emanating from the (il (logic of the 
development process are averted and the current con-
figuration of property relations is sustained and legiti-
mised. When urban planning is analysed from a politi-
cal economy stance which positions it within the 
framework of capitalist economic and political struc-
tures, the limits to participation and the purpose served 
by its limitation are crystallised. 
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